Abstract. The Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP) has been in existence implicitly in almost all number theoretic based cryptosystems. This work defines the BFHP in a more general setting and produces an efficient asymmetric cryptosystem. The cryptosystem has a complexity order of O(n 2 ) for both encryption and decryption.
Introduction
In Section 2 of this work, we define the Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP) and illustrate its existence within the RSA hard problem. We then proceed to produce an asymmetric cryptosystem in Section 3 that thoroughly utilizes the BFHP concept. In Section 4 we produce a table of comparison between known asymmetric algorithms and the algorithm introduced in this work. We conclude in Section 5.
Bivariate Function Hard Problem
The following proposition gives a proper an analytical description of the "Bivariate Function Hard Problem" (BFHP). Proposition 1. Let F (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) be a multivariate one-way function that maps F :
If at minimum m − n − 1 = 129, it is infeasible to determine (u, v) from G(u, v). Furthermore, (u, v) is unique for G(u, v) with high probability.
Remark 1. Before we proceed with the proof, we remark here that the diophantine equation given by G(u, v) is solved when the parameters (u, v) are found. That is, the BFHP is solved when the parameters (u, v) are found.
Proof. We begin by proving that (u, v) is unique for each G(u, v) with high probability. Assume there exists u 1 = u 2 and v 1 = v 2 such that
We will then have
Since gcd(A 1 , A 2 ) = 1 and A 2 ≈ 2 n , then the probability that Y is an integer is 2 −n . Next we proceed to prove that to solve the diophantine equation given by G(u, v) is infeasible to be solved. The general solution for G(u, v) is given by
and
for some integer t. To find u within the stipulated interval (u ∈ (2 m−1 , 2 m − 1)) we have to find the integer t such that 2 m−1 < u < 2 m − 1. This gives
Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is
Since m − n − 1 = 129, then m − n − 2 = 128. Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct t is infeasible. This is also the same scenario for v.
Remark 2. It has to be noted that the BFHP in the form we have described has to be coupled with other mathematical considerations upon F 1 , F 2 , u, v to yield practical cryptographic constructions.
where j is the number of times M e is reduced by N until C(M, j) is obtained. The problem of determining (M, j) from equation (5) is the RSA BFHP. The pair (M, j) is unique with high probability for each C(M, j).
Remark 3. With little effort, one can also produce a BFHP for the discrete log problem (DLP). Analysis could also be done within the framework given for the RSA-BFHP.
The following 3 analytical results gives a clear picture regarding the RSA-BFHP. All result re-affirms the "infeasibility" of trying solve the RSA problem. We also produce a corollary that may shed some light regarding the RSA problem and integer factorization. Lemma 1. The RSA BFHP is infeasible to be solved.
the general solution is X = X 0 − N t and j = j 0 + t for some t ∈ Z. It is easy to deduce that the correct t belongs in the interval (2 k(e−1)−1 , 2 k(e−1) − 1). Current RSA deployment has k = 1024. Hence, to solve the RSA BFHP is infeasible.
is also found. Thus, the RSA BFHP is solved.
From C(X, j) = X − N j, if the RSA BFHP is solved means that (M, j) is found. Thus, the RSA problem is solved. It is obvious that the factoring of N was not obtained.
A new asymmetric cryptosystem based on the BFHP

Common values
This scheme is to facilitate secure communication asymmetrically between 2 parties namely A (Along) and B (Busu). For both of them there will 2 sets of public parameters determined pre-communication and a common n-bit prime number. The party that initiates the communication will utilize the set
while the other party will utilize the set G 2 = (g 3 , g 4 ). These public parameters are co-prime to each other and belong in the interval (2 n−1 , 2 n − 1). In fact both parties will have keys generated by both sets for the eventuality of either initiating communication or accepting incoming information. In this work we assume Along is initiating while Busu is accepting secure information.
• Key Generation by Along -sender INPUT: The public prime number p, the public sets G 1 and G 2 . OUTPUT: A public key for sending information e A , an ephemeral private key d A for generating e A and a secret pair (α 1 , α 2 ).
